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SOME REALISM ABOUT UNILATERALISM
ANTHONY CHASE*
"The fresh look is always the fresh hope."
-Karl Llewellyn'
THE GREAT FEAR
A specter is haunting international politics-the specter of American
unilateralism.2 Robert Rubin, the highly regarded former United States
("U.S.") Secretary of the Treasury, told National Public Radio's Diane Rehm
that he hoped 2004 would bring a national debate over the country's "rela-
tively unilateralist policy," an approach to "how we deal with the rest of the
world" that is "not going to work but also creates an enormous antagonism
against the United States."3 At one level, anxiety about American unilateral-
ism simply expresses a desire that U.S. foreign policy, and the way it is ap-
plied, should be popular with as many nations as possible. And it would be
nice if some of those nations could more enthusiastically support American
policy, whether diplomatically, financially, or militarily.
At another level, the unilateralist critique covers concerns about an
American embrace of the doctrine of preemption or preventative wars 4 as
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1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 510 (1960).
2. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR
GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2003); SAUL LANDAU, THE PRE-EMPTIVE EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO BUSH'S
KINGDOM (2003); CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE
FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS (2003). For a wide range of contributors with conflicting views
on the subject, see generally UNDERSTANDING UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Gwyn Prins ed., 2000) [hereinafter Prins]; UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Malone & Khong].
3. The Diane Rehm Show (WAMU radio broadcast, Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.wamu.org/dr/2003/drarc_031201.html (audio commentary) (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
4. Jeff Guntzel, Iraq Peace Team Briefing #2: Preemptive Strikes and International
Law, Aug. 27, 2002, http://www.iraqpeaceteam.org/pages/iptbriefing_2.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2004).
Addressing an enthusiastic crowd of West Point Military Academy graduates on June 1, 2002,
George W. Bush declared, "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and
resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend
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well as an abandonment of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the United
Nations ("U.N.") organization.5 Does the launching of preemptive wars re-
vealed a new and dangerous departure in American foreign policy? Has
American deployment of military force without U.N. Security Council sup-
port signaled that the U.S. has decided to undercut the premiere world peace
organization, an institution the U.S. played such a critical role in bringing
into existence? The purpose of this essay is to measure the current criticism
of American unilateralism against both the reality of contemporary politics
and the rules of international law.
our lives." The crowd roared. Bush was thinking about Iraq that morning. He was not think-
ing about international law.
Id.
5. See Richard Falk & David Krieger, Subverting the UN, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 2002,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/UnitedNations/Subverting_UN.html.
To save the UN from the [Bush] Administration's destructive and radical unilateralism, other
key nations will have to stand up to its bullying. France, Russia and China, because of their
veto power in the Security Council, could withhold legal authority for America to proceed to
war. Whether they will exercise this power, given the pressure they're under from the Ad-
ministration, remains to be seen .... If [the US] were to go ahead with war, it could deliver a
death knell not only to Iraq but also to the UN itself. It is emblematic of US global wayward-
ness that it is necessary to hope for a veto to uphold the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN
as a force for peace but to also be concerned that Administration threats of unilateral military
action could render the veto ineffective and thereby the role of the Security Council largely
meaningless.
Id. Within months, the fears of Falk and Krieger were realized. See Matthew Rothschild,
Bush Trashes the United Nations, THE PROGRESSIVE, April 2003,
http://www.progresive.org/april03/roth0403.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); see also Mi-
chael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2003,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030501 faessay 11217/michael-j-glennon/why-the-security-
council-failed.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
[O]n March 5 [2003], France and Russia announced they would block any subsequent resolu-
tion authorizing the use of force against Saddam. The next day, China declared that it was tak-
ing the same position .... At this point it was easy to conclude, as did President Bush, that the
UN's failure to confront Iraq would cause the world body to "fade into history as an ineffec-
tive, irrelevant debating society." In reality, however, the council's fate had long since been
sealed. The problem was not the second Persian Gulf War, but rather an earlier shift in world
power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to
function. It was the rise in American unipolarity-not the Iraq crisis-that, along with cultural
clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the council's credibil-
ity.
Glennon, supra.
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FIRST STRIKE
The current language of "preemptive strikes" originates in American
political discourse immediately following the Second World War.6 Kenneth
Waltz observes that during the brief period when the U.S. alone possessed
nuclear weapons, it was debated whether we should "drop the bomb quickly
before the likely opponent in a future war has time to make his own."7 The
question remained unanswered on that summer afternoon in 1949 when news
arrived that the Soviets, within five months of the establishment of NATO,
had detonated an atomic device in Kazakhstan. On the one hand, such stra-
tegic thinking could lead to George C. Scott's hysterical antics in front of the
NORAD-like global positioning map in Stanley Kubrick's classic motion
picture, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Bomb (1964). On the other hand, one suspects that when India and Pakistan
periodically approach the brink of nuclear war over Kashmir, most Ameri-
cans hope the Pentagon has something up its sleeve, designed to preempt the
kind of atomic conflagration on the Indian subcontinent which, uncontrolled,
might finally produce Carl Sagan's legendary "nuclear winter."
But the most recent version of anti-preemption ideology was ably, even
nobly, offered by West Virginia Democrat, Robert C. Byrd, on the floor of
the U.S. Senate, in February, 2003.8 Undaunted by the drum beat of war or
the building momentum behind President Bush's Iraq invasion plan, Senator
Byrd deplored his colleagues' willingness to "stand passively mute" while
the country was dragged into a potentially disastrous war. "This nation,"
declared Byrd, "is about to embark upon the first test of a revolutionary doc-
trine."9 The senator did not hesitate to identify it: the doctrine of preemp-
tion, he asserted, "the idea that the United States or any other nation can le-
gitimately attack a nation that is not imminently threatening but may be
threatening in the future-is a radical new twist on the traditional idea of
self-defense.""° Not least was Byrd's concern that the preemption doctrine
"appears to be in contravention of international law and the UN Charter." "
6. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Good Foreign Policy a Casualty of War: Today, It Is We
Americans Who Live in Infamy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at MI, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0322-01.htm [hereinafter Schlesinger 1].
7. KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR 236 (rev. ed. 2001).
8. Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senate Remarks: We Stand Passively Mute, Feb. 12, 2003,
http://byrd.senate.gov/byrdspeeches/byrdspeeches_2003february/byrdspeeches_2003marc
h-list/byrd speeches_2003march list l.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
2004]
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Arthur Schlesinger heralded Byrd's comments, endorsed a plan to have
the senator's "doctrine of preemption" speech printed in the New York
Times as a "full-page advertisement," and decried the fact the U.S. was go-
ing to war "not because of enemy attack," but because of "the Bush Doctrine
of preventive war."'' 2  Like Byrd, Schlesinger saw the radical preemption
doctrine as representing "a fatal turn in U.S. foreign policy."' 3 Schlesinger
had himself argued the previous summer that "[o]ne of the astonishing events
of recent months is the presentation of preventive war as a legitimate and
moral instrument of U.S. foreign policy.' 14 Denied legitimacy, morality, and
any basis in law or the Charter of the U.N., how could such a "revolutionary
doctrine" have been adopted as the driving principle behind the deployment
of American troops abroad, in the Iraqi desert, very definitely in harm's
way? 5
In order to answer this question it is necessary to juxtapose, to the ad-
monitions of Byrd and Schlesinger, two interesting and widely-
acknowledged features of American political history. 16 First, as was fre-
quently observed at the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist assault on
New York and Washington, Americans are hardly accustomed to having
their homeland attacked. 7 Whether as targets of bombers, missiles or civil-
ian aircraft transformed into missiles; this was something new and uncom-
fortable, and deeply traumatizing, for many thousands of Americans.8 The
territory of the U.S. and its possessions had not been attacked since the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941.19 And setting that devastating strike on
America's Pacific fleet to one side, the country had never been attacked, let
alone invaded, at least not since the British, our partners at the time in a not
so special relationship, rather unceremoniously burned the White House in
1814.20 Dolly Madison managed to save a full-length portrait of George
Washington from the flames.
Second, another common observation, provided for our purpose here by
Seymour Melman, is that "[t]he Permanent War Economy of the United
12. Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Immorality of Preventive War, Los ANGELES TiMES, Aug.
26, 2002, reprinted in History News Network, http://hnn.us/articles/924.html [hereinafter
Schlesinger II].
15. Id.
16. See Byrd, supra note 8; Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
17. See Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. See Schlesinger II, supra note 14.
20. See Press Release, White House Historical Association (Fall 1998),
http://www.whitehousehistory.org/10/subs/images-archives/j oumal4prerelease.pdf.
[Vol. 28:3:631
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States has endured since the end of World War II in 1945" and, indeed,
"[s]ince then the U.S. has been at war-somewhere--every year, in Korea,
Nicaragua, Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan-all this to the accompani-
ment of shorter military forays in Africa, Chile, Grenada, Panama."'2 Like
Melman, Sidney Lens refers to "permanent war, ' 2 Carl Boggs to "milita-
~,,24rism,'2 and Chalmers Johnson to the "sorrows of empire. 2  In their classic
study of America's postwar economy, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy identify
defense spending as crucial to the maintenance of "monopoly capital" it-
self.2 5 In any event, when you add it all up, something has got to give. It
simply is not possible for a country virtually never to be attacked, go to war
only when attacked, and to be constantly at war. The weak link here is the
part about going to war only when attacked. It is true that America has at
least had the option of being isolationist throughout most of its history be-
cause it is a big country, bounded by two large oceans, and has thus been
relatively safe, at least until recently, from foreign navies or the armies of
God. It is also true that the U.S. has been almost constantly at war with
someone somewhere for the past sixty years. To suggest that going to war
before the fight has a chance to come to you is somehow un-American, how-
ever, or more politely is "against the American grain," is just not supported
by the historical record.26
PERMANENT WAR
Anyone who has seen Frank Capra's compelling World War II-era
documentary film series, Why We Fight, knows that there appeared to be
some pretty compelling reasons for American soldiers being sent to fight in
Europe, even though nobody in Europe had attacked the U.S. Capra's argu-
ment was simple and straightforward, designed specifically for young sol-
diers about to be sent into combat: we fight now in order to prevent some-
thing a lot worse later. Who can forget Capra's globe drenched in totalitar-
ian domination-like a can of paint dumped on the free world-smothering
21. Seymour Melman, They Are All Implicated in the Grip of a Permanent War Econ-
omy, COUNTERPUNCH, http://www.counterpunch.org/melman03152003.html (Mar. 15, 2003).
22. See SIDNEY LENS, PERMANENT WAR: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA (1987).
23. See CARL BOGGS, MASTERS OF WAR: MILITARISM, AND BLOW BACK IN THE ERA OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2003).
24. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE
END OF THE REPUBLIC (2004).
25. See PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER (1966).
26. See LENS, supra note 22; BOGGS, supra note 23; JOHNSON, supra note 24; BARAN &
SWEEZY, supra note 25.
2004]
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our rights and liberties under a flood of fascist conquest? Not exactly "a
wonderful life" to look forward to-so that's why we fight.27
Not just Korea and Vietnam, but the whole of the Cold War was fought
not in self-defense, conventionally understood, but to prevent or preempt the
communists from gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere (Cuba), or
another foothold in the Western Hemisphere (Nicaragua), or to try to keep
that first domino from falling (China today, Japan tomorrow), or the second
(Vietnam, then Laos and Cambodia), or to prevent our allies from realizing
we could not be trusted to keep our word or our international commitments.
Americans were prepared to do whatever we had to abroad, now, in order to
prevent being forced to live under the communist jackboot, at home, later.
One of the last great theatrical events of the Cold War was the costly ABC
television miniseries, "Amerika," which not only lost twenty million dollars
but also somehow failed to explain how the Russians were able to take over
the U.S. without a fight.2 The part of the script where, finally, Americans
take up arms in the actual defense of the homeland, of American territory-a
real war rather than more of the same endless worldwide preemptive skir-
mishing-was simply lost, or redacted, or erased, like the famous 18.5 min-
ute gap in Richard Nixon's tapes. Whatever else the doctrine of preemption
or preventative war may be it is not, as Senator Byrd described it, revolution-
ary.29 And, contrary to Arthur Schlesinger, it is not something invented by a
former owner of the Texas Rangers baseball team.
The point, obviously, is not that the doctrine of preemption is moral or
legal or even necessary-just that it is neither new nor something foreign to
the American experience. Despite their recent potshots at Bush administra-
tion foreign policy, Byrd and Schlesinger know this perfectly well. Senator
Byrd, after all, was a supporter of the Vietnam War in spite of the fact the
Vietnamese had not landed sampans on Redondo Beach.3" Byrd, like strate-
gic policy planners in the Johnson and Nixon administrations, justified the
brutal American war in Southeast Asia as a mission to prevent Vietnam, and
then its neighbors, from falling to communism. Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, described the Vietnamese as merely "stalking horses" for Red China.
Never mind the fact, as it turned out, that the only domino to fall after Saigon
27. See JOSEPH MCBRIDE, FRANK CAPRA: THE CATASTROPHE OF SUCCESS (St. Martin's
Griffin 2000) (1992).
28. See Anthony Chase, Historical Reconstruction in Popular Legal and Political Cul-
ture, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1969, 2009-11 (1994).
29. Byrd, supra note 8; see also Paul J. Nyden, Byrd Questions War Spending Request,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines
03/0923-12.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
30. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:631
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was the genocidal regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, to which the Vietnamese
communists mercifully put an end.3
Schlesinger warned readers of the Los Angeles Times, in 2002, that by
"using his weaponry, [Saddam] Hussein would give the U.S. president his
heart's desire: a reason the world would accept for invading Iraq and enforc-
ing 'regime change."' 3 2 He also alerted members of Britain's Royal Institute
of International Affairs in 1998 to the fact that, in the U.S., the "isolationist
impulse has risen from the grave in what has always been its essential pro-
gramme - unilateralism."33  Thankfully, Charles William Maynes, joining
Schlesinger at Chatham House in 1998, assured the Royal Institute that "no
country in history has been able to maintain a hegemonic position without a
degree of ruthlessness in its international policies that would be profoundly
distasteful to the American people."34 Distasteful to the American people,
perhaps, but not to Arthur Schlesinger, not when in government.
As an assistant to President Kennedy, Schlesinger was much less skep-
tical of unilateralism, the doctrine of preemption, and "regime change." Al-
though Cheddi Jagan, the socialist Prime Minister of Guyana, met personally
with Kennedy in Washington and assured him that Guyana had no interest in
becoming a Russian base, Schlesinger nevertheless advised the President, as
Jagan later recalled, "that the way to remove from the government my party,
which had won three successive elections, was to change our traditional first-
31. See Nyden, supra note 29. "Byrd again referred to the Vietnam War, which he sup-
ported at the time." Id.
But who was the aggressor in Vietnam .... The Sino-Soviet split became so evident by the
mid-1960s that even the most militant Cold Warriors had to take notice. Perhaps the "enemy"
was China, and Dean Rusk conjured up the frightening image of a billion Chinese armed with
hydrogen bombs.
John Garry Clifford, Vietnam in Historical Perspective (1975), excerpted from John Gary
Clifford, Change and Continuity in American Foreign Policy Since 1930, in PATHS TO THE
PRESENT: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (James 1. Patterson ed., 1975),
http://www.ecfs.org/projects/fieldston57/since40/units/unit4/supplements/cliff-vietnam.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004). "Containment continued during the 1960s, when the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations escalated US military intervention against the advance of Viet-
namese communism, which they believed was a stalking-horse for Chinese imperialism in
Southeast Asia." Jeffrey Record, Thinking About China and War, AEROSPACE POWER J.,
http:// www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/winOl/record.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2004). See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, ANATOMY OF A WAR: VIETNAM, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (The New Press 1994) (1985).
32. Schlesinger II, supra note 14.
33. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Unilateralism in Historical Perspective, in
UNDERSTANDING UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 18, 24 (Gwyn Prins ed.,
2000).
34. Charles William Maynes, Two Blasts Against Unilateralism, in UNDERSTANDING
UNILATERALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 30, 39 (Gwyn Prins ed., 2000).
2004]
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past-the-post district electoral system., 35 In the event, it was the Central In-
telligence Agency that did the heavy lifting in removing Jagan's government,
but Schlesinger seemed much less concerned, at that time, about unilateral
"regime change" than now.36 Schlesinger's own account of these events, in
his memoir of the Kennedy presidency, 37 does not differ materially from that
of Jagan, a democratically-elected national leader who lost his job because of
an American wish to preempt any possibility of his moving farther to the left,
down the road.3 8 Although Arthur Schlesinger, in 2003, found rather thin the
Bush/Rumsfeld case for Iraq's representing an imminent threat to the U.S.,
there has of course never been even a remote possibility that Guyana could
launch a military strike against the U.S. 39 But for psychotic cult leader Jim
Jones, most Americans would probably never have heard of Guyana. Never-
theless, whatever eventuality was to be prevented, even John F. Kennedy
believed in the doctrine of preemption.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
More rigorously if less accessibly, debate over the legitimacy of pre-
emptive war is fought out by international lawyers within the doctrinal ter-
rain of what is called "anticipatory self-defense."4 Arthur Schlesinger, who
has at least heard of the term, proves once again that a little knowledge can
be a dangerous thing. "The president has adopted a policy," warns
Schlesinger, "of 'anticipatory self-defense' that is alarmingly similar to the
policy that imperial Japan employed at Pearl Harbor on a date which, as an
earlier American president said it would, lives in infamy."' This from the
35. Cheddi Jagan, Is Guyana to be Another Vietnam? (1968), at http://www.jagan.org/
articles2i.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
36. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Unilateral Preventative War: Illegitimate and Immoral, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/UPWIaI.html; see
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE
774-79 (1965) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER 111].
37. See SCHLESINGER III, supra note 36.
38. See CHEDDI JAGAN, THE WEST ON TRIAL: MY FIGHT FOR GUYANA'S FREEDOM
(1966); JOHN PLATrS-MILLS, MUCK, SILK AND SOCIALISM: RECOLLECTIONS OF A LEFT-WING
QUEEN'S COUNSEL 399-417 (2001).
39. Schlesinger I, supra note 6.
40. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 71-79 (1993); YEHUDA Z. BLUM, FOR ZION'S SAKE 174-89 (1987); RICHARD J.
ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 136-50 (1989); JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-17 (1894); T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
609-10 (6th ed. 1910).
41. Schlesinger 1, supra note 6.
[Vol. 28:3:631
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taciturn, bow tie-wearing, Democratic historian of the New Deal? When
British Labour Party leader Tony Benn pushed his loyal phalanx of support-
ers further to the left, in spite of the fact that Margaret Thatcher, the "Iron
Lady," and her right-wing conservative colleagues waited menacingly just
over the horizon, impatient to bury the coal miners' union along with the rest
of the British welfare state, historian Eric Hobsbawm suggested the wily
Benn had "lost [his] marbles."42  American anti-war protestors from the
1960s, instructed at the time by cautious liberals like Professor Schlesinger,
never to employ sheer hyperbole in their denunciation of American policy
(like referring to President Lyndon Johnson as a "fascist pig"), must now be
shaking their heads in disbelief as a roller derby of cat's-eyes, boulders, and
steely shooters come careening off Schlesinger's atrophied brow.
First, the Japanese did not attack Pearl Harbor in anticipation of an im-
minent attack on Japan by the U.S. Navy-indeed the "reasoning of Japan's
leaders was that the United States had little effective power in the western
Pacific."43 More than that, Japan's wartime goals were primarily economic.
The Japanese "strategy was to carve out an area within which economic self-
sufficiency would be possible and to defend it until the United States tired of
war."" So the legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense could not be made
to fit the facts in the Pacific in 1941. Second, Schlesinger would have been
on firmer ground had he attributed the anticipatory self-defense argument to
the Nazis: Hermann Goring, in fact, sought to justify at Nuremberg the
German occupation of the Rhineland by claiming it constituted merely "mo-
bilization measures in ... case of an attack on Germany. 4 5 Germany's inva-
sion of Europe, in G6ring's account, was carried out "from the very begin-
ning only in the interest of defense., 46 Third, the issue is not whether the
anticipatory self-defense argument can be misused-Schlesinger, a staunch
defender of Arkansas lawyer, Bill Clinton, should know by now that any
legal argument can be misused. But that is not a reason for abandoning the
law. The issue is whether in a given set of circumstances, a state's use of
force meets the requirements of an anticipatory self-defense argument.
Fourth, Schlesinger not only fails to convey a sense of what rules govern the
doctrine's application but makes it sound as if it is just another excuse for a
policy of "anything goes." That is not true. Finally, one would never glean
from Schlesinger the knowledge that anticipatory self-defense doctrine's
42. TONY BENN, THE END OF AN ERA: DIARIES 1980-90, at 250 (Ruth Winstone ed.,
1992).
43. JOHN K. FAIRBANK ET AL., EAST ASIA: TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION 721 (1973).
44. Id. at 720.
45. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945-46, at 128 (1997).
46. Id. at 129.
2004]
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basic formulation not only comes from American jurisprudence but is actu-
ally more than 150 years old.
"The classic illustration of this right of anticipatory self-defense," ob-
serve Anthony Arend and Robert Beck, "was the Caroline case., 47 Leaving
the facts of the case to one side, it was Secretary of State Daniel Webster,
who in 1842 in a note to Britain's Lord Ashburton, coined the language that
became the test for when a state can legitimately engage in anticipatory self-
defense.48 In short, "customary international law recognized a right of an-
ticipatory self-defense provided the conditions of necessity and proportional-
ity were met."'49 Philip C. Jessup makes the interesting point that the Caro-
line test "is obviously drawn from consideration of the right of self-defense
in domestic law ... [but] [i]t is an accurate definition for international law."5°
And just as an individual, under domestic criminal law, need not wait until
he has been killed before he is legally allowed to defend himself against im-
minent deadly force, states need not wait until they have been bombed or
their borders transgressed before they initiate a proportionate defense. This
point of law has frequently been echoed in comments by President Bush to
the effect that the U.S. need not wait for an attack like the one on the World
Trade Center in order to be able to defend itself against terrorism."
THE END OF HISTORY
Beyond his rejection of preemption/anticipatory self-defense, there was
another extraordinary claim made in Senator Byrd's February 2003 anti-war
speech.52 He argued that unilateral American action against Iraq violated
international law and the U.N. Charter.5 3 It is, in fact, the decision by the
Bush administration to invade Iraq without prior approval from the U.N.
Security Council-indeed, in the face of a certain French veto-that has led
47. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 72.
48. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42-43
(1963); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105-06 (2000); 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, PEACE 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
49. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 72.
50. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 164 (1948).
51. See Robert Kagan, On to Phase II, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2001,
http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/wpost I 12701.asp.
Saddam and his regime pose a direct and unacceptable threat to the United States. And there-
fore the United States has the right to take preemptive action. America need not wait 'for ter-
rorists to try to strike us again,' the president said recently. We can take 'the fight to the en-
emy.'
Id.
52. Byrd, supra note 8.
53. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:631
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so many administration critics to argue that the U.S. has effectively buried
the most important international organization ever created. To adequately
evaluate this argument, it will be necessary to situate recent American his-
tory in its proper relationship to international law and the practice of the U.N.
And to do that, it is essential to briefly survey the background of world poli-
tics, if you will, and the contours of modem American foreign policy.
If the U.S. found itself almost continuously at war, from Pearl Harbor
through the fall of communism, the end of the Cold War suggested the pos-
sibility that a very different kind of world was just over the horizon. Every-
one discussed how best to spend the "peace dividend." When the U.N., with
most of its member states on the same page, launched a military intervention
in Kuwait in 1991, it was the U.N.'s first real military mission since the Ko-
rean War. When the effort succeeded, and Iraqi troops were ejected from
Kuwait, it seemed a new day had dawned. The U.N., it was argued, had fi-
nally fulfilled the dream of San Francisco and Dumbarton Oaks. Former
Reagan administration advisor, Francis Fukuyama, went so far as to suggest
this new world represented, perhaps, "the end of history. 5 4 With both fas-
cism and communism decisively defeated by western liberalism by the close
of the twentieth century, grand theorists might be forgiven for having jumped
to the conclusion that seemingly intractable conflicts dominating the past
century had finally been resolved.
Extending an inchoate, certainly uneven, human rights doctrine, how-
ever, into Yugoslavia at the point of a gun, the Clinton administration caused
some to fear that America could not necessarily be trusted to use its rela-
tively uncontested, world class military power wisely. "In the midst" of
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, Charles William Maynes recounts, he
"had the occasion to ask the Secretary-General of NATO in public to cite the
source for the legality of NATO's decision to attack another country."55 The
only response he got was that members of NATO had endorsed the action.56
Worse still, it was believed the U.S. might have bombed a pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan, certainly based upon flimsy intelligence, in an effort to dis-
tract domestic focus from the President's personal political problems. When
President Clinton unleashed a bombing campaign against Baghdad on the
eve of a Congressional vote to impeach him, a chorus of critics accused the
President of "wagging the dog"--that is, of manufacturing a military crisis
abroad to divert attention from the Lewinsky scandal.5 "I would like to
54. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (2d ed. 1993).
55. Maynes, supra note 34, at 36.
56. Id.
57. See Anthony Chase, Elections and Party Politics, in COLUMBIA COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY ON FILM (Peter C. Rollins ed., 2004).
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think that no American president would even consider using the military to
help him remain in office," observed House Majority Leader Richard Armey,
a Texas Republican, but he continued, "the fact that Americans are express-
ing these doubts shows that the president is losing his ability to lead."58
Operating under the umbrella of NATO peacekeeping, the U.S. did not
seem to believe it needed U.N. Security Council permission to deploy force
against the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The desire to extend
American might, however, has increased exponentially with the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001. Clearly prepared to use whatever force might
be required, the U.S. invaded and conquered first Afghanistan, then Iraq, in
quick succession. Despite majority opposition within the Secretary Council
and warnings from Secretary General Kofi Annan that the U.N. might soon
follow the League of Nations into the dustbin of history, the U.S. invaded
Iraq, backed only by a "coalition of the willing," and briefly raised an
American flag over Baghdad the day the capital city was taken. In June
2003, the British Broadcasting Company reported that, based on polling re-
sults, eighty-one percent of Russians and sixty-three percent of the French
opposed the U.S. attack on Iraq.59 In both Jordan and Indonesia, the U.S.
was regarded as more dangerous than al-Quaida, and in nations as diverse as
Canada, Brazil, France, and South Korea, the U.S. was perceived to be more
dangerous than Iran, Syria, or both. 60 Germans, according to the authorita-
tive news magazine, Der Spiegel, considered George Bush to be more dan-
gerous to world peace than Saddam Hussein.61
While the U.S. occupation of Iraq dragged on during the summer of
2003 and American soldiers were killed in sniper or mortar attacks, debate
raged on both sides of the Atlantic over why no weapons of mass destruction
had yet been found and whether President Bush and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair had leveled with trusting citizens, prior to launching hostilities,
about the actual threat to Atlantic security posed by Saddam Hussein. If
Democratic Senator John Kerry called for "regime change" in the U.S. dur-
ing the war, another Democrat (and, briefly, presidential hopeful) Senator
Bob Graham hinted that impeachment might be appropriate if Bush could be
58. Bill Sammon, Clinton Unleashes Missiles on Iraq, Stalling House Vote to Impeach
Him, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1998, (quoting Richard Armey), http://www.mega.nu:8080/amp
/stonewall boguswar.html.
59. Poll Suggests World Hostile to US (BBC TWO news broadcast, June 16, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2994924.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
60. Id.
61. Umfrage Zum Weltfrieden: Deutsche halten Bush fir gefdnrlicher als Saddam,
SPIEGEL ONLINE POLITIK, Feb. 14, 2003, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,
235071,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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shown to have intentionally lied about Iraq's nuclear threat in his State of the
Union address.62 Fletcher School professor, Michael J. Glennon, writing the
lead essay in the Summer 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs, announced what
then seemed increasingly obvious: the U.N. experiment was over.63 "With
the dramatic rupture of the UN Security Council," wrote Glennon, "it be-
came clear that the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law
had failed."'
While the subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces pro-
vided the Bush administration a brief respite from criticism of post-war U.S.
policy in Iraq, it did not lead to any sort of let up in the mounting U.S. death
toll. American service men and women continued to be killed almost every
day by an Iraqi resistance that no longer appeared dependent upon Saddam
Hussein for either strategic planning or inspiration. Turning his father's late-
term political situation upside down, George W. Bush and his advisors hoped
that an improving economy could still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat,
that domestic success could trump the perception of international failure and
thus secure a Republican return, by however narrow a margin, to the White
House for another four years. But with continued European refusal to sig-
nificantly aid the effort to build "democracy" in Iraq coupled with American
denial of reconstruction contracts to private firms from nations that President
Bush regarded as having earlier blocked America's path to war, the unilater-
alist tone to American foreign policy remained. Unchecked by the U.N. and
seemingly indifferent to international law, the U.S. had become, if not a
rogue state then, at least, a cowboy state, feared and disliked by many, in-
cluding some former allies, around the globe. It was this state of affairs that
former-Secretary Bob Rubin hoped would be seriously debated in the 2004
presidential election campaign.
GRAND STRATEGY
Was there a method to what, at least, several Democratic presidential
contenders and some leading European diplomats regarded as a form of
madness? Was there any sort of political or historical backdrop against
which American foreign policy in the new century could be made to make
some kind of sense or reveal a plan or strategy, of sorts? And what should be
62. Glen Johnson, Kerry Says US Needs Its Own 'Regime Change, 'BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
3, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0403-08.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004); Graham Defends Argument for Impeachment, CNN.cOM, July 27, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003ALLPOLITICS/07/27/ graham.impeach/.
63. See Glennon, supra note 5.
64. Id. at 16.
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the proper relationship, anyway, between foreign policy goals and interna-
tional legal rules?
Public international law is a norm, a set of standards, rules for govern-
ing the conduct of states in their relations with other states.65 That is why it
is alternatively referred to as international law or "the law of nations. 66 But
it is not a political strategy, a set of goals and purposes animating foreign
policy. International law is, rather, a framework within which a strategy is
mounted. Liddell Hart, Richard Rosecrance, and Arthur A. Stein describe
grand strategy as a military policy combined with other elements of national
strength. Yet they go further and, relying on strategic theorists like Richard
Howard and Paul Kennedy, argue that grand strategy encompasses "the ad-
aptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a
state. 67 They specifically underline the "necessity of including domestic
politics and economics in any broad calculus of grand strategy. 68
Consider the domestic economic and political angle first. One of the
most fruitful theories of social development was given comprehensive state-
ment in the work of historical sociologist Barrington Moore. In his land-
mark, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore sketches "with
broad strokes the major features of each of the three routes to the modern
world., 69 The first route "combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy
after a series of revolutions: the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution,
and the American Civil War."7 One of the distinguishing aspects of these
early modernizers-Britain, France, the U.S.-was the strength of "a group
of the middle class," or as economist Kohachiro Takahashi put it, "the class
of free and independent peasants and the class of small-and middle-scale
commodity producers."'" This is the route to modern industrial society that
Moore calls that "of bourgeois revolution, a route that England, France, and
the United States entered at succeeding points in time with profoundly dif-
ferent societies at the starting point. "72 Moore is quick to point out that the
second path to modernization "was also a capitalist one, but, in the absence
65. Public International Law, International Committee for Human Rights,
http://www.ichr-law.org/english/expertise/areas/pil.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
66. Id.
67. Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy, in THE DOMESTIC BASIS OF GRAND
STRATEGY 4, (Richard Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 1993).
68. Id. at 5.
69. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 413
(1966).
70. Id.
71. Kohachiro Takahashi, A Contribution to the Discussion, in THE TRANSITION FROM
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM 68, 94 (Rodney Hilton, ed., 2d ed. 1976).
72. MOORE, supra note 69.
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of a strong revolutionary surge, it passed through reactionary political forms
to culminate in fascism. ' 73 Here, Moore is describing the characteristic de-
velopment of Germany and Japan. And following Max Weber's "conflict in
the two ways of capitalist activity," Takahashi also contrasts social develop-
ment in Western Europe with that of Prussia and Japan where "the erection
of capitalism under the control and patronage of the feudal absolute state was
in the cards from the very first."74 The third and final route observed Moore,
in 1966, "is of course the communist one.
' 75
In Law & History, The Evolution of the American Legal System,7 6 the
reader will find a much more systematic and fully explained rendition of this
particular approach to history-the periodization over three centuries of an
unfolding dialectic of bourgeois transformation, the map of how a particular
approach to modern industrial society worked itself out in legal terms in the
U.S. What is important here, however, is simply to stress the progressive
and liberal capitalist nature of American society and politics, the particular
form taken in this country by what Rosecrance and Stein refer to as the do-
mestic bases of grand strategy. Given American liberal, rather than authori-
tarian, capitalist "path dependence," how did this domestic orientation shape
American grand strategy over the past century.?
77
Immanuel Wallerstein characterizes the First and Second World Wars
as part of one long conflict: "the end of the First World War represented far
more a truce in a 'thirty years' war' than a definitive victory for the Allies. 78
"Germany had lost a battle in its struggle with the US to be the successor
hegemonic power to Great Britain" but, Wallerstein concludes, "it had not
yet lost the war.",79 Two decades later, the U.S. entered into a strategic alli-
ance with the Soviet Union in order to defeat fascism. In so doing, the U.S.
adopted a "left of center" international position.8" "When Germany moved
definitively 'right' under the Nazis," asserts Wallerstein, "it isolated itself
diplomatically and allowed the US to construct the worldwide diplomatic
'popular front' which would ultimately make possible final victory in the
73. Id.
74. Takahashi, supra note 71, at 94-95.
75. MOORE, supra note 69.
76. ANTHONY CHASE, LAW AND HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (1997).
77. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY (1994).
78. Immanuel Wallerstein, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE WORLD-
ECONOMY 69 (1984).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 71.
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'thirty years' war' of 1914-45."8I More recently, constitutional lawyer Philip
Bobbitt has similarly regarded the First and Second World Wars as encom-
passed within one "Long War," a war that "could not have ended so long as
fascism was alive in a great power., 82 "Resolute actions might have deterred
Germany for a time; absent such actions,' 83 in Bobbitt's view, "the tempo-
rary stalemate of Versailles was bound rapidly to end in violence. 84 How
different was the view from Washington during the years immediately fol-
lowing the Second World War-with fascism defeated (in fact, prosecuted in
court) and communism on the rise in Asia and enjoying a newly-won pres-
tige in Europe due to the central role played by communists in a range of
bold, if rarely militarily significant, anti-fascist resistance movements during
the war. In terms of the international political picture, argues Wallerstein,
"the US emerged as the uncontested hegemonic power."85 "Furthermore,
there were no longer any significant 'rightist' governments among the core
states. 86 Thus, grand strategy took another turn. "[T]he US," says Waller-
stein, "quickly shifted therefore from being 'left of center' to being the leader
of a 'free world' alliance against the world left."87 So just as the United
States had assumed a position "left of center" in the 1930s, when it became
apparent that fascism would be the main enemy for the foreseeable future,
the U.S. took up an international stance "right of center" once the fascist
threat had been eliminated.88
While in the sweep of history, the fall of communism in 1989 may still
deserve to be categorized as "current events," it seems clear from the present
vantage point that the twists and turns of American grand strategy have al-
ready found expression in the post-communist world. Turning the "reverse
course" (as it was called when the U.S. occupation policy in postwar Japan
shifted to the right) on its head, the U.S. positioned itself "left of center" after
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, i.e., once the communist threat had
been eliminated. The U.S. has gone to war three times since 1989: twice
against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and once again Slobodan Milosevic's Yugo-
slavia. While Hussein called upon all Muslims to resist American imperial-
ism's effort to destroy Islam and Milosevic, in fact, directed his "ethnic
81. Id.
82. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 37 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Wallerstein, supra note 78, at 71.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally CHASE, supra note 76, at 197-202.
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cleansing" against the ethnically-Muslim Albanian Kosovars in Yugoslavia,
the two regimes had something crucial in common, even beyond constituting
totalitarian dictatorships: they were both ideologically neofascist. Historian
Walter Laqueur, in his exhaustive annotation of sources on fascism, produces
Saddam Hussein as the essential contemporary neofascist, and as mundane a
source as an online student encyclopedia cites Saddam Hussein, along with
France's Jean-Marie LePen and Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as prominent
examples of neofascist political leaders.89 The latter reference adds to the
neofascist list "the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj."9 The
Serbian Radical Party, supported by deposed Yugoslavian President, Slobo-
dan Milosevic, sponsored paramilitary forces in the Bosnian war and is even
farther to the right than Milosevic's party. After receiving about a quarter of
the votes cast in the autumn 2002 Serbian presidential elections, Seselj was
indicted for crimes against humanity and jailed by the war crimes tribunal in
the Hague. Nevertheless, at the end of December, 2003, Slobodan Milosevic
"and another U.N. war crimes suspect [Vojislav Seselj] won seats in Serbia's
parliament as [the] extreme nationalist [Serbian Radical] party swept week-
end elections."'" If the U.S./NATO intervention in Yugoslavia managed to
secure its main aim, the protection of Albanian Kosovars from genocidal
brutality administered by the country's Serb majority, it has clearly failed to
dissuade the Yugoslavian people from endorsing the parliamentary politics
of neofascist war criminals.
Identifying the fundamental domestic basis of American grand strategy,
following Rosecrance and Stein, it seems clear the U.S. has employed con-
ventional balance of power tools to defend the social and economic founda-
tions of the liberal capitalist state. In a nutshell, American grand strategy
over the past century can be characterized in terms of a shift to the left (com-
bating imperial Germany at the front end of the Long War, making the world
"safe for democracy"), a shift to the right (engaging the Red Army in Russia
in 1918), a shift left (diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union during
Roosevelt's New Deal and a wartime "popular front" to defeat fascism), a
shift right (the Cold War), and finally, or at least most recently, another shift
back to the left (America at war with neofascism in Eastern Europe and the
89. Neofascism, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=409628 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004); WALTER
LAQUEUR, FASCISM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1997); Dusan Stojanovic, Milosevic and
Another Jailed War Crimes Suspect Win Parliamentary Seats, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (AP),
Dec. 30, 2003, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20031229-1738-serbia-
elections.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
90. Stojanovic, supra note 89.
91. Id.
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Middle East in the wake of communism's demise). Thus, a remarkable pat-
tern begins to emerge. Of Barrington Moore's three roads to modern indus-
trial society, the U.S. has rigorously adhered to the first, that of liberal capi-
talism. V. I. Lenin characterized bourgeois democracy as the best possible
political shell for capitalism and America's grand strategy, with or without
acknowledgement of Lenin, has certainly amounted to a consistent effort to
hew that course, drawing further to the left when fascism, the option on the
right, appeared ascendant and correspondingly further to the right when
communism, the option on the left, appeared to be gaining strength.92 Once
the century's various channels and currents were charted, steering the helm
of state became a relatively straightforward process, well within the capacity
of Republicans and Democrats alike.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Grand strategy, of course, is sometimes capable of dictating a foreign
policy well within the confines of international law, and always, in any
event, stands in an important relationship to international law-but the two
are not the same. Defining international law as "the rules of legitimate be-
havior for states," 93 Philip Bobbitt argues that because international law helps
to shape the political goals that grand strategy exists to serve, it is "among
the first resources consulted in a crisis, and its treaties and treatises are
among the last resources deployed when violence has ended and its conse-
quences must be healed., 94 Where, then, is international law to be found?
The generally recognized sources of international law, authoritatively estab-
lished in the charter of the World Court, the primary judicial organ of the
international legal system sitting in The Hague, the Netherlands,95 are: inter-
national conventions; international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; general principles of law accepted by civilized nations; and
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
various nations.96 Testifying to the relative stability of this legal regime, the
92. See MARK MAZOWER, DARK CONTINENT: EUROPE'S TWENTIETH CENTURY (1998);
ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991(1994).
93. BOBBITT, supra note 82, at 356.
94. Id.
95. See LORNA LLOYD, PEACE THROUGH LAW: BRITAIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
IN THE 1920s (1997); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE WORLD COURT IN ACTION: JUDGING AMONG
THE NATIONS (2002) (for the official World Court web page, see International Court of Justice,
Peace Palace, the Hague, the Netherlands, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinforma
tion.htm.).
96. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR, AND
NEUTRALITY 55-56 (Arnold D. McNair ed., 1926).
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list of sources has remained unchanged since the World Court was founded,
as the Permanent Court of International Justice, in 1922. In his "Report and
Commentary" on the World Court project, published by the Carnegie En-
dowment in 1920, after listing these specific sources of international law,
James Brown Scott provides a detailed examination of judicial decisions by
which the law of nations had already been incorporated into the laws of Eng-
land and the U.S., respectively. Although the international Advisory Com-
mittee of Jurists that drafted the World Court's charter worked long and hard
to agree to the language adopted, eventually, as the American delegate to the
Committee, former-Secretary of State Elihu Root, put it at the time: "Leg
over leg the dog went to Dover."97
This corpus of law has long been in the making, dating back to the work
of the important Dutch writer, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645),98 and to the Peace
of Westphalia, whose adoption in 1648 signaled, in effect, that "the doctrine
of sovereignty achieved 'codification.' 99 The emergence of the sovereign
state as the dominant political unit, at least in Europe, was a prerequisite to
the rise of a modem international law, a set of legal rules and principles
whose "persons" are sovereign states. To be sure, the "fact that Shakespeare
preceded the birth of modern international law," as Theodore Meron reminds
us, "does not mean that no broadly recognized rules applied, at least in prin-
ciple, to nations' conduct of war."' 00 In fact, it can be said that the gradual
emergence of international law after the Peace of Westphalia represented a
stage in the long process of development whereby principles applying to the
conduct of war were transformed into the modern law of war.
For many, however, the transformation of principle into law, so far as
international law is concerned, is more apparent than real. In what sense can
the rules of international law be regarded as genuine law-or, at least, what
is usually meant by the reference "law," the kind of statutory and case law
with which we are most familiar? And how can law exist in the absence of
any enforcement mechanism, especially without a police force, criminal
courts, jails, and so forth? Even without these, international law still looks a
good deal like conventional, i.e., domestic or municipal law. Consider a
97. JAMES BROWN ScoTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 48, 106-111 (1920),
reprinted in 7 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DIVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW PAMPHLET SERIES 32-37 (2000).
98. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HuGo GROTIUS (1969); HUGO
GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
99. AREND & BECK, supra note 40, at 16.
100. THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S LAWS AND SHAKESPEARE'S WARS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LAW OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 11 (1993).
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concrete example: on July 25, 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA")
abandoned its Llapushnik Prison Camp due to Serbian military forces retak-
ing the area around the camp.'' A number of prisoners held in the camp
were marched into a clearing in a nearby forest and eleven of them were shot
and killed. °2 Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, and Agim Murtezi were accused of
being responsible for these murders and, in February 2003, were arrested by
KFOR forces.'0 3 The three detainees were transferred to the detention unit of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and
two of them will be tried, like the Serb political leaders, Slobodan Milosevic
and Vojislav Seselj, for their conduct in Bosnia."°
Bala and Musliu are charged with having planned, instigated, ordered,
or committed acts or omissions such as imprisonment, violence, and murder
against Serb and Albanian civilians held in the Llapushnik camp.' °5 Agim
Murtezi's defense counsel, Stephane Bourgon, informed the ICTY that Mr.
Murtezi was not the individual identified in the indictment and Murtezi was
subsequently released. 0 6 This is a remarkable example of international law
in practice where the elements of a conventional western legal system are
clearly present (statutory rules, accusation, arrest, investigation, trial, pun-
ishment upon conviction) and, indeed, where some features are in play, in
spite of the fact they might not be present in the standard legal process of
many states. For example, Bala and Musliu, both members of the KLA, are
being prosecuted for the same kind of infractions (crimes against humanity,
violations of the laws or customs of war) as the Serb officials, Milosevic and
Seselj. Murtezi was released because a careful investigation revealed he was
the wrong man. And Fatmir Limaj, the KLA commander on whose orders
Bala and Musliu allegedly relied, a member of Parliament and public figure,
managed to leave Yugoslavia on a business flight before he could be ar-
rested.'0 7 Thus can one identify elements of equality before the law and due
process-even occasional common law's inadequacy of enforcement-that
tend to characterize municipal legal systems. Why, then, must international
law, "as law," receive such low marks?
101. Press Release, ITCY Office of the Prosceutor, Haradin Bala, Isak Muslu, and Agim
Murtezi Transferred to the ICTY Following Their Indictment for Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2003/p729-e.htm (Feb. 18, 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Press Release, The Prosecutor v. Umjaetal: Agin Munezi Released Following the
Withdrawal of the Indictment Against Him, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2003/p736-e.htm
(Feb. 28, 2003).
107. See Press Release, ITCY Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 101.
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H.L.A. Hart, one of legal philosophers, does not think that it should. 108
Though reference to "international law" has been an accepted usage for al-
most two centuries, Hart nevertheless acknowledges that "the absence of an
international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally
organized sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate in the breasts of
legal theorists."'0 9 But Hart believes that any comparison of international
law with, and in contrast to, municipal law is misleading." 0 War within the
international system, he maintains, is not the same thing as violence between
individuals, not least because "long years of peace have intervened between
disastrous wars."'' . This circumstance is without analog to municipal legal
systems, and further, Hart regards as crucial that when international legal
"rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that they are not binding; in-
stead efforts are made to conceal the facts."' 12 Citing the immediate subordi-
nation of new states to international law and the similar case of states acquir-
ing new territory or access to the sea, Hart rejects as "dogma," with little
respect for practical facts, the notion that "international obligations as self-
imposed.""' International law, in Hart's view, can no more be reduced to
mere moral exhortation than can the rules of municipal legal systems them-
selves. ''4
Writing in 1930, in the second edition of his Grammar of Politics, Har-
old Laski acknowledged, as H.L.A. Hart would a generation later, that "[t]he
famous epigram that international law is not law at all has had a serious ef-
fect historically, both upon its prestige and its range of influence." I " But
Laski optimistically assessed the prospects for international law, suggesting
that its rules "should be made universally binding through the power to have
them definitely interpreted by a recognised tribunal."' 6 It was the (then) new
World Court which Laski hoped would constitute just such a tribunal, a court
charged "with the task of consolidating international law, and revising its
substance from time to time in the light of experience.""' 7 Thirty-years later,
after a worldwide economic depression, another devastating world war and
the onset of a cold war, Laski was still prepared to defend international law
108. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (2d ed. 1965).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 214.
112. Id. at 215.
113. H.L.A. HART, supra note 108, at 219.
114. See generally id. at 224, 227-32.
115. HAROLD J. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 649 (1925).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 648.
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"as law"--certainly by comparison with municipal law."18 "[T]o make the
legal character of international law dependent upon its success in getting
applied," argued Laski, "is to apply to it canons of validity which the jurist
does not dream of applying to national law.""' 9 Before considering whether
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have, because of their transparent
unilateralism, transgressed that international law in which Hart and Laski
invested such confidence, it remains necessary, first, to juxtapose the devel-
opment of the U.N. to the structure of international law.
THE UNITED NATIONS
The World Court has been sitting continuously in the Hague since the
Court's founding in 1922-with the exception, that is, of those years when
the Nazis overran and occupied Belgium and the Netherlands. Describing
the "creation of a nominally 'new' Court" after the defeat of the Nazis at the
end of World War II, Howard Meyer states that "in doctrine, procedures,
acceptance and application of precedent, facilities, and most staff personnel,
even a few judges-to-be," the post-war World Court was quite properly
treated as a "re-created or revived Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice." 120 Thus, the World Court has been and remains the world's preeminent
international legal institution. The U.N. organization, from the very begin-
ning, was conceived more as a political than legal institution. To be sure, all
legal institutions are "political" in the same sense that all reality is socially
constructed. But the U.N. was not designed to replace international law or
the World Court, and in that sense, is more about power politics than it is the
law of nations. All of the major historical sources on the founding of the
U.N. underscore complex problems of politics, not law, which had to be
overcome, first by President Franklin Roosevelt, and subsequently by Presi-
dent Harry Truman and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, so that agree-
ment could eventually be reached at the U.N. founding conference in San
Francisco. 121
The U.N. Charter established the dominant position, within the organi-
zation, of the Security Council. The distinction alluded to here, between law
118. Id.
119. HAROLD J. LASKI, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS 79 (1962).
120. MEYER, supra note 95, at 88.
121. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, PURSUING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE (1988);
TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N. (1997);
EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945-1955: THE COLD WAR YEARS
(1982); STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION, THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(2003).
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and power, between international rules and Security Council votes, was ef-
fectively drawn early on, in 1950, by John Foster Dulles. "It is not safe to
give coercive power to the Security Council or to any other international
body," Dulles argued, "unless that body is bound to administer agreed
law."' 22 While world peace might be one of the goals of the U.N., the or-
ganization was not bound by international law. "At Dumbarton Oaks," ob-
served Dulles, "the Big Three did not make any provision whatever for de-
veloping international law.' ' 123 To be sure, Secretary of State Dulles was a
right-wing politician, but the same could not be said of University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley's Hans Kelsen, described by Philip Bobbitt as the "leading
figure of twentieth century jurisprudence.' 24 In his treatise on the U.N., first
published in 1950, Kelsen argues "[t]he competence of the Security Council
coincides to a great extent with the competence of the entire Organisa-
tion."' 125 This is just another way of saying what many others have said
since: given the role assigned to the Security Council under the Charter and
the veto system of voting on the Council itself, the latter very nearly is the
U.N. in terms of effective power.126 "The Security Council," concludes Kel-
sen, "has almost the character of a governmental body., 127 Crucially, Kelsen
points out that the Security Council, as a governmental body answerable only
to itself, is not bound to follow any regime of law and "[i]f a state can rely
upon one of the five powers," i.e., one of the five permanent members of the
Security Council (the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and China), then "no
action can be taken against it, even in case of open violation of the law. The
veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council may lead
to a political system of more or less open clientage."' 128 And whatever else it
may be, a political system of open clientage should not be confused with a
legal system governed by international rules. 129
These comments from Dulles and Kelsen, now more than fifty years
old, apply as perfectly today as they did when written. After all, the U.N.
Charter, effectively exempting the Security Council from the rule of law, has
gone virtually unchanged since it was written. In fact, Mohammed Bedjaoui,
a member of the Institut de droit international, recently-retired judge and
former President of the World Court, opens his book, The New World Order
122. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, WAR OR PEACE 198 (1950).
123. Id.
124. BOBBiTr, supra note 82, at 586.
125. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 279 (1950).
126. Id. at 275.
127. Id. at 276.
128. Id. at 275.
129. ld. at 274-79.
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and the Security Council, by quoting John Foster Dulles: "'The Security
Council is not a body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a law unto it-
self."" 131 Judge Bedjaoui adds that Dulles "was giving utterance to a vague
idea - never clearly articulated but none the less generally received or suf-
fered - to the effect that the Security Council applies a law of its own, i.e. an
autonomous body of rules, much of which the Council elaborates at its entire
discretion."' 31 Conservative columnist and television commentator, Laura
Ingraham, in a book attacking the current U.N. and its supporters as elitist,
heralds the late Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York for his courageous
stand against America's opponents while he was our U.N. Ambassador.
132
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that she is a graduate of the University of
Virginia Law School and clerked at the U.S. Supreme Court, Ingraham does
not once mention Moynihan's defense of international law-indeed, she
seems never to have heard of international law.
13 3
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, according to Moynihan, "believed in
law, and as much on those grounds as any other was suspicious of organiza-
tion."'34 Extending Lansing's distinction, Moynihan argues that "the inter-
ested reader wants to be clear that the question of international law is inde-
pendent of the question of international organization. The League of Na-
tions, like the United Nations later, was designed to enforce law, not to make
it . . . .""' But as long as the Security Council is a "'law unto itself,'"'36 as
Dulles put it, or in Bedjaoui's phrase, "applies a law of its own," then it will
remain important to sharply distinguish international law and its enforcement
from the work of international organizations like the U.N.
137
SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-HELP
Calcovoressi, Wint, and Pritchard record there were
at the end of 1941 three separate theatres of war: first, the USSR
where Leningrad was invested, German forces had come within
sight of Moscow... secondly, the remnant of a war in the west
130. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL I (Ber-
nard Noble, trans., 1994) (emphasis omitted).
131. Id.
132. See LAURA INGRAHAM, SHUT UP AND SING: How ELITES FROM HOLLYWOOD,
POLITICS, AND THE UN ARE SUBVERTING AMERICA (2003).
133. Id.
134. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 40 (1990).
135. Id.
136. BEDJAOUI, supra note 130, at 1 n.1.
137. Id. at 1.
[Vol. 28:3:631
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/9
SOME REALISMABOUT UNILA TERALISM
maintained by the Royal Air Force in Great Britain but pushed out
into the Atlantic and waged chiefly by German U-boats and their
pursuers; and thirdly, the Mediterranean where the Germans and
Italians were trying to win North Africa.1
38
Then, on December 7, the air force of the Empire of Japan bombed the
American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not
surprising that, as George Schwarzenberger observed at the time, the "sug-
gestion has been put forward which is as startling in its simplicity as in its
fallacy: International Law has broken down.' 139 There was a break down, of
course, but it was one of international organizations, not international law.
At no other time in history was it more important to understand the distinc-
tion between the two, later drawn by Dulles, Kelsen, and Moynihan, than at
the end of 1941. "The deniers of International Law put up a seemingly for-
midable barrage of arguments," continued Schwarzenberger, yet it was cru-
cial to resist "this destructive and defeatist thesis" a thesis or argument that
"attempts to establish an equality of status between the defenders of Interna-
tional Law and ... their deadliest foes."' 141 It was Schwarzenberger's inten-
tion, in his brief lectures on the subject during 1940-1941 at University Col-
lege, London, to "show what weapons International Law can put in the hands
of its defenders.''
As we know, among those weapons were the armed forces of the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the other Allied Powers.'42 Without the
sanction of any international organization, but on behalf of international
law's enforcement, even against the most formidable of outlaw states, the
Allies not only won the Second World War, but they placed many of those
responsible for having waged aggressive war on trial in Nuremberg at war's
end. 4 1 Just as the Soviet Union and Great Britain had been attacked by
Germany, and responded with military force, the U.S. was attacked by Japan,
and international law clearly authorized these nations to employ unilateral
action-or "self-help"-to defeat the Axis powers.1" Twenty years later,
138. PETER CALVOCORESSI ET AL., TOTAL WAR: CAUSES AND COURSES OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 113 (2d rev. ed. 1989).
139. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN LAWLESSNESS
10 (1943).
140. Id.
141. Id. at ll.
142. See CALVOCORESSI ET AL., supra note 138.
143. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 274.
144. See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 115 (Arnold D. McNair
ed., Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 1926) (1906). "A State may be driven into war because it
cannot otherwise get reparation for an international delinquency, and may then maintain that it
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Schwarzenberger was somewhat less enthusiastic about the role of self-help
within international law. "Although action of a State amounting to self-help
may be within the law," Schwarzenberger wrote in 1962, "no certainty exists
on the level of international customary law that it will keep within such lim-
its."' 4 5 This is, in a sense, a rather odd comment. While it is true of "action
amounting to self-help," it is only true of self-help because it is actually true
of all action in which states engage in the world. While state conduct may
fall within the parameters of international law, there are no guarantees that
states will confine their conduct within the limits of international law. In
other words, Schwarzenberger's description of the nature of self-help would
appear to be tautological. "In these circumstances," he adds, "the classifica-
tion of intervention, reprisals, and war as measures of self-help or sanctions
of international customary law is a euphemism. It provides a convenient
legal cloak for action which more often than not belongs to the sphere of the
rule of force.' ' 146 Again, virtually every attempt to label state conduct, espe-
cially the deployment of military force, as justified by international law will
amount to either a legal cloak (an intentional misrepresentation of the con-
duct) or a legal defense (an accurate characterization of law applied to facts).
The only way to tell the difference between the two is by reference to the
rules.
Some "self-help arguments" will correspond to the canons of interna-
tional law whereas others will not. For example, the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial established that the Nazi argument, cited earlier, was wrong to the ef-
fect that the German offensive action in World War II was merely anticipa-
tory self-defense. The British argument that in bombing Germany, England
was engaged in self-defense, was a much more compelling argument under
international law. After all, it was Germany that attacked England, not the
other way around. The different positions of Great Britain and Germany, at
the end of the war, with respect to international law and criminal responsibil-
ity, hinged on a good deal more than the stark reality that Britain was among
exercises by war nothing else than legally recognised self-help." Id. "Again, the very nature
of international law, resting as it does largely on customary rules built up as rationalizations
by jurists and statesmen on historical precedents, permitted governments to assert that armed
coercion was a procedural method sanctioned by customary international law." THE LAW OF
NATIONS: CASES, DOcUMENTS, AND NOTES 684 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 1938). While Secu-
rity Council voting on issues of war and peace is extremely contentious, there is little or no
disagreement as to a state's fundamental legal right to self-defense. The factual issues are the
ones most hotly debated. See GRAY, supra note 48, at 85. "In theory it should always be
possible to determine whether there was an armed attack and who is acting in self-defence.
But in practice the situation is more complex." Id.
145. GEORGE SCHWARTZBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1962).
146. Id.
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the victorious. It is true that if Hitler had won the war, German leaders
would not have been put on trial at Nuremberg. But that fact does not some-
how reduce to naught the real content of international law. Again, in his
treatise on the U.N., Hans Kelsen writes that if an "international organization
abolishes or restricts the principle of self-help established by general interna-
tional law, it must fulfil two requirements." '147 The two requirements cited by
Kelsen are that the organization itself must guarantee to settle the dispute
between states that precipitates a use of force and must also enforce that set-
tlement to the degree that an injured state's ability to protect itself is limited
by the organization.'48 The U.N., Kelsen candidly acknowledges, does not
meet either of these requirements.'49 Any organization, including the U.N.,
which simultaneously attempts to limit a state's ability to act in its own self-
interest and yet does not satisfy the two requirements Kelsen outlines "con-
stitutes, instead of an improvement, a dangerous deterioration of the legal
status under general international law."' 5 °
THE RULE OF LAW
If the U.S. (or any other state) must choose between the legal right of
self-defense and fidelity to the U.N. Charter, then national security dictates
violation of the charter or at least a policy of indifference to the organization
and its pretense to authority. The right to self-defense is worthless if its ex-
ercise hinges on the meaning given to that phrase by each of the five perma-
nent members of the U.N. Security Council. '5' Since the Bush administra-
tion disagreed with France, and probably China and Russia as well, over
whether invading Iraq was a legitimate exercise of American self-defense (or
anticipatory self-defense), what it finally comes down to is a choice between
the U.N. on the one hand and, on the other, what much of the rest of the
world saw as recourse to self-help.'52 Following Dulles, Kelsen, Moynihan,
and others, the U.S. may in fact be faced with a choice between self-help
enforcement of international law and abandonment of international law alto-
gether out of deference to the U.N. and its political process. It is virtually
impossible to square that political process with the rule of law. Kelsen
147. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 270.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. But see contra, Jorge Ramirez, Iraq War: Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful
Unilateralism? 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (2003).
152. Id. at 21-22.
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makes two points tending to buttress such a conclusion.5 3 First, he asserts
that the "veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
which places the privileged powers above the law of the United Nations,
establishes their legal hegemony over all the other members of the Organisa-
tion and thus stamps on it the mark of an autocratic or aristocratic regime."'54
Kelsen argues that we cannot fail to see a contradiction between such a re-
gime and the purported goals of the U.N. The veto, in Kelsen's view, cannot
be reconciled with an institution that "presents itself ideologically as the
crowning of a war waged for victory not only of arms but of ideals, espe-
cially the ideal of democracy."'' 5 5 But Alexis de Tocqueville demonstrated a
century earlier, in Democracy in America, that the rule of law and democracy
are not equivalent, that majorities can in fact impose their will in spite of and
at the expense of the rule of law.'56 And this view represents, of course, a
fundamental precept of America's "anti-majoritarian" constitutionalism.
It is Kelsen's second point, however, which has such great import for
the argument advanced here. He asserts that at the level of international rela-
tions,
the principle of equality must refer to the states as members of the
community. This is the reason why the Charter proclaims as its
first principle the sovereign equality of all its members. There is
an open contradiction between the political ideology of the United
Nations and its legal constitution.
The determination of international law, with reference not to law at all but to
the votes of Security Council members, places the Council above the law.
And the veto privilege held by five permanent members of the Council vio-
lates the very first principle of the rule of law: the sovereign equality of all
citizens (in this instance states) before the law. The U.N. is thus, as Kelsen
makes transparent, an Orwellian institution in which some states are more
equal than others. 5 8 All law stands or falls with the credibility and effec-
tiveness of the rule of law itself and even when equality before the law seems
to mask a persistent inequality of social and economic power, formal juridi-
cal equality, nevertheless, constitutes a great advance over regimes of aris-
tocracy, autocracy, serfdom, slavery, and terror.
153. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 274.
154. Id. at 276.
155. ld. at 277.
156. ld. at 276-77.
157. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 277.
158. Id.
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Confirming this point from the philosophical side of things, Hegel had
already warned, Franz Neumann reminds us, that though legal equality is
purely formal, that is negative, it should not for that reason be discarded.'59
And from the historical side, reflecting on those inequalities that ultimately
limit justice through legal formality, Edward Thompson adds:
But I do not conclude from this that the rule of law itself was
humbug. On the contrary, the inhibitions upon power imposed by
law seem to me a legacy as substantial as any handed down from
the struggle of the seventeenth century to the eighteenth, and a true
and important cultural achievement ... 160
The reader may or may not agree with Sir Henry Maine's conclusion that
since "all the modem progress of society seem[s] to be intimately connected
with the completest freedom of contract, and in some way almost mysteri-
ously dependent upon it, [we] should shrink from tampering with so power-
ful an instrument of civilisation."' 16' But the transition from status to con-
tract, whose historical description made Maine famous, constitutes a real
advance in the direction of both liberty and equality. In subordinating inter-
national law and the progressive regime of rules and values it represents to
the archaic power politics of status voting on the Security Council, nations
take a great leap backward in their foreign relations.
"By the middle of 1998," Blakesley, Firmage, Scott and Williams point
out, "the Security Council has applied Chapter VII to authorize the collective
use of force in Korea, and the Gulf War."'162 It is frequently suggested that in
San Francisco, in 1945, no one would have predicted that U.N. authorization
of the use of force to keep or restore world peace would have taken place
only twice in the next fifty years, and, in the event, separated by forty years.
But in fact, such authorization might not have occurred at all. Only because
the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council in 1950 did authorization of
the use of force in Korea escape permanent member veto. And the authori-
zation of force in the Gulf in 1990-1991 was nearly as strange. Like Korea,
"[t]he 1990 Iraq/Kuwait conflict was another exceptional case," according to
Christine Gray, "seen by many as marking a new role for the Security Coun-
159. See HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL
THEORY (1941); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957).
160. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 265 (1976).
161. SIR M.E. GRANT DUFF, SIR HENRY MAINE: A BRIEF MEMOIR OF His LIFE 90 (J. & J.
Harper 1969) (1892).
162. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1070 (5th
ed. 2001).
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cil and the start of a new legal order."' 63 With the return to American de-
ployment of force without first seeking Security Council permission, first in
Yugoslavia, then in Afghanistan and Iraq, the "new legal order['s]" bright
and shining moment faded quickly."6 The U.N. use of force in Korea was a
fluke, the Gulf War use of force was an "exceptional case" which, if a begin-
ning at all, was merely the beginning of a war in Iraq which would end, a
decade later, with the demise of the U.N. itself. Even during the Security
Council's debate over whether to authorize force in the Gulf in 1990, the
Cuban representative pointed out that the U.N. could only authorize force
under a multinational command structure. And once the bombs began falling
on Baghdad, it was obvious that the Cubans had been right: the U.S., not the
U.N., was calling the shots. And the war would end only when the Ameri-
cans said it was over.
Still, in January 2004, Massachusetts Senator and Democratic Presiden-
tial contender John Kerry, appearing on the CBS News program, Face the
Nation, contrasted Bush the Younger's war in Iraq with that of Bush the
Elder, emphasizing that President George Herbert Walker Bush, unlike his
son, went to the U.N. with his war plan, secured the affirmative votes of Se-
curity Council permanent members (with China abstaining), and deployed a
multinational fighting force under the aegis of the U.N.'65 It was actually
more complicated than that. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Even
prior to President Bush's famous "[t]his will not stand, this aggression
against Kuwait" statement to reporters on the South Lawn of the White
House on August 5th,'6 6 Brent Scowcroft recalls a conversation he had with
the President aboard a C-20 Gulfstream flight to Aspen, Colorado: "It was in
discussion on the changes in his speech that it became obvious to me that the
President was prepared to use force to evict Saddam from Kuwait if it be-
came necessary ...., Note that Scowcroft did not say the President was
prepared to go the U.N.; he said the President was prepared to use force to
evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. 168 In fact, under first the Reagan-Bush
administration and then the Bush-Quayle administration, the United States
considered withdrawing from the United Nations because its view of the
United Nations had sunk so low. 69
163. GRAY, supra note 48, at 85.
164. Id.
165. Face the Nation (CBS News television broadcast, Jan. 4, 2004).
166. GEORGE BUSH & BRENT SCOWCROFT, A WORLD TRANSFORMED 333 (1998).
167. Id. at 318.
168. See id.
169. See DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., FROM VERSAILLES TO MAASTRICHT: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
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America's patience with the snapping and snarling underdogs in
the General Assembly had run out.... This contributed hugely to
the Reagan administration's tendency to regard the UN at best as
'a troublesome sideshow.' At worst, the US attitude came peril-
ously close to the right-wing Heritage Foundation's belief that 'a
world without the United Nations would be a better world'. [sic]
170
The President, however, was far from confident that the U.S. Congress
would endorse his decision to send U.S. troops to Kuwait.17 1 He later re-
called that after ordering the deployment of troops and equipment to the
Gulf,
[t]he news of the troop increase, particularly its size, whipped up a
new outcry in Congress and furious attacks on me that I had
changed policy and decided to go to war without consulta-
tion.... The pundits and congressmen on the morning talk shows
and the op-eds averred that I was wrecking my presidency.
1 72
Senator Patrick Moynihan, a personal friend of the President, was especially
critical and warned Bush he would need both U.N. and Congressional ap-
proval before going to war.173 Scowcroft had already determined that a Con-
gressional vote in favor of war was too much to hope for.174
Although we did explore options for the involvement of Congress,
we never seriously contemplated invoking the War Powers Reso-
lution.
We were confident that the Constitution was on our side when it
came to the president's discretion to use force if necessary: If we
sought congressional involvement, it would not be authority we
were after, but support.' 
75
So where would authority for war come from?
"While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary,"
Bush candidly acknowledges, "I wanted the United Nations involved as part
of our first response, starting with a strong condemnation of Iraq's attack on
170. Id. at 114.
171. BUSH & SOWCRAFT, supra note 166, at 396-97.
172. Id. at 396.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 397.
175. Id. at 398; see also HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL. PROBLEMS 138
(4th ed. 1994).
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a fellow member."'7 6 "UN action would [not only] be important in rallying
international opposition to the invasion and reversing it," but also the Secu-
rity Council endorsement of the use of force could provide legal authority
which the engagement of American military forces abroad otherwise would
lack.117 Although "the Cold War caused stalemate in the Security Council,"
Bush admitted, "our improving relations with Moscow and our satisfactory
ones with China offered the possibility that we could get their cooperation in
forging international unity to oppose Iraq.'17  Carefully playing their cards,
Bush and Scowcroft managed to get from the U.N. Security Council the sort
of official approval for war that they believed was beyond their reach in the
Congress of the U.S.
After the President's post-November election troop deployment, provid-
ing "'an adequate offensive military option," ' 179 and Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he
did "'not believe the President requires any additional authorization from the
Congress before committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the
Gulf,""" ° some members of Congress filed a suit in federal court seeking to
enjoin the President from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without
first "securing a declaration of war or other explicit congressional authoriza-
tion" for such action.'8 ' And, in fact, on November 30, at a meeting of bipar-
tisan congressional leaders, "President Bush made a pitch for a resolution
backing the UN vote-which avoided the problem of asking Congress for
authorization."'82 The plaintiffs, according to the court, alleged "in light of
the President's obtaining the support of the United Nations Security Council
in a resolution allowing for the use of force against Iraq, that he is planning
for an offensive military attack on Iraqi forces."'83 That, of course, is exactly
what the President was planning and, as it turned out, on January 12, 1991,
the U.S. Congress-by a vote of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the
House-managed to sign on to the war, after the decision-making was over
and just in time for the bombs to start falling on Baghdad four days later. 4
Whether the Gulf War of 1990-1991 comported with either international law
or America's national interest is an important question, but one quite sepa-
176. BUsH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 303.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (D.D.C. 1990).
180. Id. at 1151 n.31.
181. STEINER ET AL., supra note 175.
182. BUSH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 421.
183. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1146.
184. BUSH & SCOWCROFT, supra note 166, at 446.
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rate from the process by which the U.S. decided to go to war. The U.N. was
used to provide a rubber stamp for a war fought without genuine congres-
sional authorization. If this is the kind of political process Senator Kerry
envisions as a model for decision-making in a Kerry or otherwise Democrat-
White House, voters may wish to think twice about ever returning the party
of Roosevelt and Kennedy to power.
KOREA
Finally, there is that other "exceptional case:" the Korean War. The war
was exceptional for a reason with which everyone is familiar. In the summer
of 1950, when the Korean War began, the Soviet Union was boycotting the
Security Council and, as a consequence, when the Security Council voted to
authorize the use of force in Korea to repel communist aggression, the Sovi-
ets were not there to veto the use of force resolution. By the time the Gulf
War rolled around forty years later, it was the Russia of Gorbachev rather
than Stalin that sat on the Security Council.
But the Korean War Security Council vote was exceptional for another
reason, one which was not unrelated to the Soviet boycott in 1950. David
Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond write that "[a]n important leg-
acy of the Korean War, and another consequence of US dominance of the
Cold War UN, was the parody of Taiwan continuing to sit in China's Secu-
rity Council seat for 22 years after the establishment of the (Communist)
People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949."185 Indeed, it was this "parody"
or political charade that had caused the Soviets to boycott the Security Coun-
cil in the first place. So, not only were the Russians not present to veto the
use of force resolution in Korea, but the crucial Chinese vote was not cast on
behalf of the Chinese people. China's vote was not even cast on behalf of
the Taiwanese. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig describe the arrival on Tai-
wan of a defeated Kuomintang, only a few years prior to the U.N. Korea
vote:
Relations between the ruling minority from the mainland and the
Taiwan-Chinese majority met an initial disaster in March 1947.
The flagrant corruption of the Nationalist take-over authorities, be-
fore the arrival of most of their compatriots, provoked widespread
demonstrations that were countered by the systematic killing of
several thousand leading Taiwanese.
1 86
185. DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 169, at 72.
186. FAIRBANK ET AL., supra note 43, at 927.
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So, the Chinese "Nationalists" in the Security Council did not represent
China, nor did they even represent Taiwan, which was not, of course, a
member of the U.N. On what theory of the rule of law could the Kuomin-
tang-in-exile, a reactionary force that had only just invaded Taiwan, be
placed in a position to approve or disapprove, veto or authorize, a use of
force by the U.N.? What could this have to do with international law?
Although President Truman informed the American people in June
1950 that Korea had been invaded by the Communists, the truth was that
Korea had been invaded by Koreans. 187 "Korea was a unitary and independ-
ent monarchy," observes Arnold Offner, "that had long governed itself
largely by Confucian doctrine... After waging war against China and Rus-
sia, the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910.,,188 Not surprisingly, "virtually all
Koreans loathed the Japanese and their Korean collaborators."'1 89 Once Japan
was defeated at the end of World War II, U.S. officials, including Colonel
Dean Rusk, recommended that Korea be divided into American and Soviet
zones at the thirty-eighth parallel.' 90 Although Stalin agreed to this proposal,
the Soviets "quickly replaced Japanese officials and collaborators with Kore-
ans-including non-Communist, moderate nationalists as well as exiles from
Siberia."' 9' What took place between the end of the war and 1950 was
pitched battle between various forces seeking to shape the new Korean po-
litical order. While Offner claims "historian Bruce Cumings has stretched a
point by denying legitimacy to the question of who started the Korean
War, ' 92 Cumings nevertheless answers an even more important question:
was what the U.S. confronted in 1950 a civil war? 193 International law for-
bad "outside" intervention in civil wars. Summarizing the "duty of non-
intervention" and other limits imposed by international law on the ability of
outsiders to interfere in the civil strife of other nations, Christine Gray adds
that "[t]he status of these rules on forcible intervention in civil wars is no
longer controversial; it was their application that led to fundamental divi-
sions during the Cold War when the superpowers and others waged proxy
wars in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.'
194
187. See ARNOLD A. OFFNER, ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY: PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND THE
COLD WAR, 1945-1953, 367 (2002); see also BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A
MODERN HISTORY (1997).
188. OFFNER, supra note 187, at 348.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 350.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 367.
193. See OFFNER, supra note 187, at 367-68.
194. GRAY, supra note 48, at 52.
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So what the U.N. Security Council authorized in 1950, in voting to de-
ploy military force in response to North Korea's "unprovoked aggression,"
was not peace keeping or peace restoration, but in reality, a violation of in-
ternational law. 195 In 1952, while the Korean War was still going on, Hans
Kelsen pointed out that "[i]n the case of Korea the Security Council recom-
mended to the members to take enforcement action involving the use of
armed force, against 'forces from North Korea' or the 'authorities of North
Korea,' which the Security Council did not consider to be the government of
a state." '19 6 Kelsen then drew the obvious conclusion: "This implies that the
war between North Korea and South Korea was a civil war within the 'Re-
public of Korea,"' in which case "the 'armed attack' upon the Republic of
Korea by forces from North Korea could not be-as the Security Council
determined-a 'breach of the peace,' that is to say, a breach of international
peace." 197 Years later, when President Lyndon Johnson was escalating the
Vietnam War, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey advised him that "[i]n Ko-
rea we were moving under United Nations auspices to defend South Korea
against dramatic, across-the-border, conventional aggression. Yet even with
those advantages, we could not sustain American political support for fight-
ing Chinese in Korea in 1952." '198 Humphrey's words of caution are surreal in
their stupidity and incomprehension. Vietnam was, in fact, a replica of Ko-
rea. Within a few short years of the inconclusive end to the Korean War, the
U.S. illegally intervened in a civil war within Vietnam, a war without bor-
ders, and a war in which the dead, counted in tens of thousands, were over-
whelmingly American and Vietnamese. If a Korean Memorial was dedicated
in Washington D.C., alongside the much-visited Vietnam Memorial, it would
have about the same number of soldiers' names etched into its surface. If
Americans had understood the Korean War the way Robert McNamara even-
tually understood the Vietnam War, then the Vietnam War would never have
happened. The U.N., in 1950, played a key role in securing that particular
obfuscation of history.
But Korea was--except for the Gulf War-the one thing the U.N. Secu-
rity Council supposedly did right, its one achievement. It was in fact an out-
law's enterprise. Adding insult to injury, or perhaps "delict" in the sense of a
195. See also BLAKESKY ET AL, supra note 162, at 1190-1205 (civil war in international
law).
196. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 n.29 (Robert W. Tucker ed.,
2d ed. 1966) (1952).
197. Id.
198. See ROBERT DALLEK, HAIL TO THE CHIEF: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 122 (1996); see also ROBERT MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE
TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM (1996).
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criminal wrong, there was one further way in which the U.N. Security Coun-
cil vote on Korea was exceptional. Without the Russians present and with
one of Chiang Kai-sheck's henchmen voting for China, the permanent mem-
bership of the Security Council was delivered to the "Korea invaded!" lobby.
But that was not enough. Recall that the U.N. Charter, in 1950, required
seven votes, including the concurring votes of all five Security Council per-
manent members (or, perhaps, four members if one was absent) for a resolu-
tion to be adopted. Security Council Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950, which
called on U.N. members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area" had received the votes of four permanent
members, plus those of Ecuador and Norway.' 99 Egypt and India abstained,
and Yugoslavia had voted against the resolution.2° With one member of the
Security Council remaining, the resolution still required a seventh affirma-
tive vote to be adopted. 20 1 In an odd way, in a sense, a non-permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council held a veto on this one particular vote. The sev-
enth member was Cuba.
In the summer of 1950, the Cuban government's executive branch was
under the leadership of Carlos Prio Socariis, who had been elected President
in 1948. He would serve in that capacity until 1952 when he was removed
from office in a coup d'dtat, engineered by Fulgencia Batista. °2 The 1952
Cuban elections were cancelled, including the congressional race of Orto-
doxo Party candidate Fidel Castro Ruz.2 °3 Prio relocated to Miami after his
ouster from office in Cuba and, in 1955, according to Robert Levine, Direc-
tor of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami,
"[a]nti-Batista exiles in Florida, led by former President Carlos Prio Socar-
ris," sent Fidel Castro and his compatriots in Mexico "enough money to pur-
chase a barely seaworthy yacht, the Granma. ' '20 4 Near the end of 1956, the
soon-to-be legendary Granma arrived on Cuba's southern coast and was
immediately fired upon.211 Of the eighty-two rebels aboard, only twenty
survived, including Fidel Castro, his brother Rail, and Ernesto "Che"
Guevara.20 6 On October 14, 1957, U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell
199. U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 2d series, 474th mtg. at 5 (1950).
200. Id. at 5 n.12.
201. Id.; Global Policy Forum, Elected Members of the Security Council 1946-Present,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/mem2.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
202. ROBERT M. LEVINE, SECRET MISSIONS TO CUBA: FIDEL CASTRO, BERNARDO BENES,
AND CUBAN MIAMI 17 (2002)
203. Id.
204. Id. at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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held a meeting in his office with officials from Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, Department of Justice, the Treasury Department, the F.B.I, and the State
Department to discuss a letter Brownell had received from Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, expressing "concern over the activities of ex-President
Prio based on reports received from time to time from the Cuban Govern-
ment as well as from other sources."' 7 The Attorney General stated at the
meeting that "Prio's activities must indeed represent a serious issue between
our Government and the Cuban Government for Secretary Dulles to devote
his personal attention to it in this manner. '20 8 Brownell further "raised the
possibility of a conspiracy charge" against Prio and it was agreed at the
meeting that such an investigation should be seriously considered.20 9 Prio
had "financed conspiracies, using Miami Beach's Lucerne Hotel and his own
home in South Miami for meetings., 210 For his trouble in financing the anti-
Batista rebels, Prio was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department in 1958.211
Perhaps in part to atone for earlier sins, Prio became intensely anti-Castro
during the 1960s and, in 1968, along with Emilio Nfifiez Portuondo, a former
president of the U.N. Security Council, attended the "'Forum for the Libera-
tion of Cuba"' at the Kings Bay Yacht and Country Club near Coral Gables,
Florida. 212 Prio, thus, entered that murky underworld of anti-Castro paramili-
tary and intelligence operatives whose existence subsequently assured con-
spiracy theorists a thriving market for their books and movies. Former BBC
journalist, Anthony Summers, claims that Prio was a "friend of top Mafia
leaders" and "has been linked in testimony with both Jack Ruby and anti-
Castro militant Frank Sturgis. ' '213 The latter, a former CIA-employee living
in Miami and veteran of the Bay of Pigs operation, was one of the infamous
Watergate burglars. In one of those, "too weird to be true" footnotes, Sum-
mers adds that Prio "was found shot dead in 1977 ... seated in a chair, with
a pistol beside him, outside the garage of his Miami home. 
' 214
207. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs (Snow), for the Files (Oct. 22, 1957), http://www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/ca
ble/cable-10-22-57.htm.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. LEVINE, supra note 202, at 39.
211. Werner Wiskari, US. Embargo Set on Arms to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1958,
http://www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/cuban-rebels/4-3-58-embargo.htm.
212. LEVINE, supra note 202, at 178.
213. ANTHONY SUMMERS, CONSPIRACY 500 (1980); see also, ANN LOUISE BAVDACH,
CUBA CONFIDENTIAL (2002).
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BRINGING LAW BACK IN
Whatever additional job experience and training might be included in
Prio's extraordinary resume, international lawyer and treatise writer are not
among them. And even if they were, they would only qualify him to argue
before an international tribunal, not sit on one, let alone decide for millions
of Koreans and Americans whether, under the terms of international law, the
conflict that broke out in northeast Asia, in 1950, along the thirty-eighth par-
allel was or was not a civil war. The votes of politicians and dictators, their
ministers or agents, sitting from time to time on the Security Council of the
U.N., have been, and always will be, a poor substitute for legal reasoning
based upon the customary rules of law that have evolved over time and the
conventional sources of international law indexed in the charter of the World
Court. The more the U.S.-or any nation, for that matter--elaborates a
"grand strategy" that conforms to the parameters of international law, regard-
less of the politics and propaganda that invariably hold the U.N. Security
Council in a vice-like grip,"1 5 the closer they will be to formulating a foreign
policy that genuinely promotes both justice (at least that limited form of jus-
tice law standing alone can deliver) and the rule of law. The propriety of
unilateralism, the legality of unilateral action on the international plane,
raises questions of law--questions that cannot be answered in advance by
Security Council resolutions. Within the canons of the law of nations, argu-
ments can be identified both for and against the legality of recent American
military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is time that debate, however, gets
beyond the bogus issues of preemptive war and U.N. Security Council deci-
sion making. Too much is at stake for the law itself to be indefinitely ex-
cluded.
215. See Steven R. Weisman & John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. Joins Iraqis to Seek U.N. Role
in Interim Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at Al. The U.S. government, having essentially
dismissed the U.N. going into the Iraq War, seems to be reconsidering its relationship to the
organization:
The Bush administration, trying to rescue its troubled plan to restore sovereignty to Iraq, is
joining Iraqi leaders to press the United Nations to play a role in choosing an interim govern-
ment in Baghdad, administration officials said Thursday .... The new move involved yet an-
other change in strategy for an administration under pressure from shifting events in Iraq.
From the start of planning the war to oust Saddam Hussein, the administration has had an am-
bivalent attitude toward the United Nations.
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